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In the past twenty years successive governments in Britain have launched a series of 
initiatives to address growing disparities between areas of relative affluence and 
those characterised by high levels of unemployment, poor housing conditions, ill 
health and crime and anti-social behaviour. These initiatives were largely funded by 
central government and resources were channelled either to local authorities or 
partnership arrangements with boards drawn from agencies, employers and 
residents with a direct interest in the targeted areas. Early approaches to area-based 
initiatives can be traced back to the 1970s when special funding from central 
government was channelled to designated areas, for example to improve inner city 
schools. The War on Poverty and the Model Cities programme in the USA were also 
major influences including the rhetoric of „maximum feasible participation‟ (Levine, 
1970). In the 1980s regeneration strategies had favoured an economic and property 
orientation in areas where „market failure‟ was clearly evident, such as in London‟s 
redundant Docklands. With the election of the Labour government in 1997, a wider 
vision became more evident and Prime Minister Tony Blair wrote: „My vision is of a 
nation where no-one is seriously disadvantaged by where they live, where power, 
wealth and opportunity are in the hands of the many not the few‟ (SEU, 2001: 8). Two 
primary objectives were set: (i) to lower worklessness and crime, and to improve 
health, skills, housing and the physical environment, and (ii) to narrow the gap on 
these measures between the most deprived neighbourhoods and the rest of the 
country (op cit.: 8). Both proved far more difficult than originally envisaged and 
neither was fully achieved. 
 
At the beginning of the new millennium Britain was becoming an increasingly divided 
nation. In the 10 per cent most deprived wards in 1998, 44 per cent of people relied 
on welfare payments, compared with a national average of 22 per cent and over 60 
per cent of children lived in households that depended on welfare payments; the 
proportion of burglaries and violence against the person were significantly higher and 
43 per cent of all housing did not meet decent standards compared with 29 per cent 
nationally (op cit.: 12). Moreover, 70 per cent of all people from ethnic minorities lived 
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in the 88 most deprived local authority districts, compared with 40 per cent of the 
general population (op cit.: 14). These stark facts relating to the concentration of 
multiple deprivation clearly had a wider impact on society and the need for concerted 
action became a priority for both main political parties.  
 
The period under review is a remarkable one in that central government was willing 
to channel large amounts of public resources into a relatively few areas suffering 
varying levels of deprivation. In the past, the management of resources and delivery 
of services at the local level were perceived as entirely the responsibility of local 
government. This raises fundamental questions about why this was considered such 
a priority, whether tackling deprivation at the local level, rather than through national 
strategies, was the best approach, how far the target areas and populations changed 
for the better, and to what extent were the objectives over-ambitious and unlikely to 
be attainable. 
 
Two decades later most of these initiatives have come to an end and a series of 
national evaluations have been published. These enable us to reflect on what has 
been achieved and what lessons can be learnt for the future. This chapter will be 
divided into three parts. The first will describe the main characteristics of area-based 
initiatives (ABIs) towards areas of deprivation in England. The second will discuss the 
main findings regarding impact and outcomes of three main regeneration 
programmes: the Single Regeneration Budget (SRB), the New Deal for Communities 
(NDC) and the Neighbourhood Management Pathfinders (NMP) which operated 
between in England between 1993 and 2010. The discussion here will relate solely to 
initiatives in England because separate programmes were launched in the devolved 
administrations of Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. The final section will briefly 
outline the paradigm shift towards the „Big Society‟ which occurred after the election 
of a coalition government in May 2010. 
 
Key Characteristics of Area-Based initiatives 
The ABIs under consideration here had a number of characteristics in common. They 
had evolved out of a perception that central and local government had failed to 
channel sufficient resources to areas of need and to rectify poor service delivery. In 
addition, policy delivery normally occurred in „silos‟. Previous initiatives had tended to 
address single policy areas such as housing, education and health and, it was 
argued, improvement would only emerge from a holistic approach to a 
neighbourhood and its residents and for this additional resources would be needed. 
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As a result, new governance regimes of collaboration and partnership had to be 
established to co-ordinate what had become disjointed and non-hierarchical networks 
of agencies involved in local service delivery. 
 
There are six key characteristics of the ABIs discussed in this chapter. First, the 
areas selected were largely based on a statistical analysis of Census and related 
data published and updated regularly by central government as the Index of Multiple 
Deprivation (CLG, 2011) which ranked local authorities by a standard set of 
indicators of deprivation. These indicators measured seven sets of statistical data 
relating to: income, employment, health, education, housing, crime and the 
environment. The Index then ranked each local authority area according to its level of 
deprivation. In identifying ABIs, local authorities were invited to nominate areas, or 
submit bids, which were then approved if they met a range of criteria, including levels 
of deprivation. The precise boundaries were normally determined locally and these 
tended to include a population of approximately 10,000. Residents‟ perceptions of 
„community‟ were rarely taken into account. 
 
A second set of characteristics related to the management of these initiatives. While 
the finance was normally channelled through the local authority as the „accountable 
body‟, the project itself was under day to day management of a board. This was 
normally made up of representatives of key „stakeholders‟ in the area: officers and 
elected members from the local authority, representatives from other agencies such 
as the health service and police, executives from local businesses or business 
organisations, local voluntary and community organisations, elected councillors and 
residents. The reasons for this commitment to a partnership approach emerged from 
the view that the post-industrial landscape was increasingly creating inter-agency 
networks which required close collaboration and that substantial economies could be 
achieved if effective working relationships could be established. Small teams of 
officers worked on project planning and delivery and reported directly to the board. 
Officers were normally seconded from local agencies and often proved highly 
motivated. Their main responsibility was to prepare and deliver locally agreed action 
plans. This formulation of boards and officer teams were characterised as „local 
regimes‟ by one commentator (Lawless, 2011: 530).    
 
The third set of characteristics related to the power relationship between central 
government and the local delivery boards. This was not always a smooth and 
productive relationship. Central government not only devised the programme and 
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provided most of the resources but also wanted to retain control over how resources 
were used and approve the representation of different interests on the board. 
Governance arrangements and funding were managed by the ten regional offices, 
made up of representatives of central government departments, and based in the ten 
English regions. Thus the Government Office for London was responsible for ABIs in 
the capital. In addition, a complex „performance management system‟ was devised 
whereby the local teams had to follow detailed guidelines, obtain approval for certain 
levels of expenditure and to submit regular reports. The local boards and teams had 
the authority to draw up annual action plans and to decide on priorities within the 
overall resource envelope given to them. The politics of the relationship was not 
always straightforward and if things went wrong blame could be past backwards and 
forwards. Residents were often confused about ownership and responsibilities and in 
some cases could not understand why the projects were not functioning solely in 
their interests (see for example Hoggett (ed.), 1997). 
 
A further characteristic was the flexibility surrounding the preparation of annual 
delivery plans. These were prepared locally and then approved centrally within 
predetermined budget parameters. There was considerable freedom as to the 
objectives set and projects were often funded and delivered by a variety of different 
agencies. These might include physical and environmental projects, those aimed at 
particular problems in the area – anti-social behaviour, drug-dealing and teenage 
pregnancy for example – and those designed to assist particular minorities, such as 
asylum-seekers, the unemployed and those with disabilities for instance. 
 
The initiatives being discussed here involved varying degrees of community 
engagement, although the concept of „community‟ is fraught with contested 
definitions and meanings. There appeared to be an implicit assumption that target 
areas were made up of one, relatively homogeneous community which could be 
persuaded to engage with the project team. In practice, community is used as 
shorthand for a variety of often conflicting interests united or divided by age, gender, 
ethnic origin, length of residence, housing tenure and many other fracture points. In 
addition, there was uncertainty about how best to engage residents and how far 
those involved needed to be representative of the wider community(ies). Concepts 
such as bridging and bonding social capital (Mclean et al., 2002) have been applied 
in this context but again problems of definition arise. The programmes discussed 
below used a variety of community development models and NDC projects for the 
first time had a majority of residents on their boards. These were often elected from 
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small groups of streets or to represent particular communities of interest. Likewise, 
the expectations varied from providing information and consulting residents about 
priorities to more complex forms of community „empowerment‟ whereby residents 
were encouraged to run services themselves and to set up community organisations 
which could take over assets such as land and buildings. The high point of this 
approach was reached in 2008 when the Department for Communities and Local 
Government produced a policy paper entitled „Communities in control‟ (CLG, 2008). 
As support for political parties and voting at the local level appeared to be in long-
term decline, some saw community engagement as a means to promote „democratic 
renewal‟ and increased engagement with local politics.  
 
The final characteristic is the constant flux of government policy at the centre and 
towards particular localities. The period of study begins in the 1990s when the UK 
was still recovering from a period of rapid industrial decline and restructuring and 
many of the future target areas were suffering high levels of unemployment, poor 
housing and ill-health. A decade later some areas were experiencing economic 
buoyancy through the rapid growth of finance and service industries while others 
remained little changed. As governments came and went and ministerial 
responsibilities changed, new policies and approaches were devised as issues rose 
and fell on the political agenda. Thus projects funded for between five and ten years 
were not only expected to deliver rapid results but also had to constantly adjust to the 
changing policy environment. In addition, ABIs were often overloaded with policy 
objectives which produced confusion and internal tensions which could not easily be 
resolved. Lowndes and Sullivan (2008) identify at least four main rationales for 
neighbourhood governance: civic, social, political and economic (op cit.: 62). 
 
Having discussed the broad characteristics of regeneration strategies in England, the 
next section goes on to review the main findings from three of these. 
 
The Single Regeneration Budget 
In November 1993 the government announced that it intended to merge 
approximately 20 separate funding streams into a single budget. Most of this was 
already committed but about £100 million was to be made available through 
competitive bidding to local authorities and other lead agencies for the following 
financial year. The bidding guidance made it clear that the government wanted to 
encourage the formation of partnerships between local state, business and 
community interests. These partnerships could select any area or type of activity 
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which required intensive treatment over five to seven years. As a result, bids were 
both area-specific and thematic and addressed issues of economic development, 
housing improvement as well as ill-health, unemployment and crime prevention. 
Project funding varied from £1m to over £10m spread over five to seven years. The 
expectation was that these resources would be used to leverage additional 
investment from the public and private sectors. 
 
In all there were six annual SRB bidding rounds for central funding and the final 
evaluation report summarises the range of projects and lead partners involved: 
 
Most partnership schemes sought to regenerate a relatively small local area, 
consisting of a number of wards, and these accounted for almost a half of all the 
schemes. A further 20% overall concentrated on an entire local authority district. 
Over two-thirds of all schemes were set to run for five years or more with a third 
designed for seven years duration. The most common lead partner was the local 
authority accounting for 53% of all schemes. This remained the dominant type of 
lead partner although by round six this had fallen to only 40% with an increase in 
joint partners and voluntary sector involvement. (Rhodes et al., 2007: iii) 
 
In retrospect, SRB was a programme which drew partly on the experience of earlier 
initiatives, such as urban development corporations, and partly experimented with 
new approaches which were to be adopted by later programmes. The innovative 
features of SRB were that resources were allocated on the basis of competitive bids 
to a range of different organisations, that it was the locality which defined the need 
and ways of addressing it, that projects should at least in part be match-funded by 
other stakeholders in the area, and that social and economic objectives could be 
linked to major physical and environmental schemes. For example, in Kings‟ Cross in 
central London funding was allocated, in part, to provide training for local residents to 
obtain work in the construction of a major housing and office development around 
two railway stations.  
 
In the six rounds of SRB approximately 60 per cent of SRB funding was spent on 
environmental and housing improvements, 10 per cent on training and employment 
and 6 per cent on education. Community development was allocated only 5.5 per 
cent of the total spend (Rhodes et al., 2005: 1934). In many cases, funding was used 
to carry out projects which local authorities felt to be necessary but could not 
otherwise fund. A survey of seven SRB areas carried out by the team from the 
University of Cambridge found only modest changes in social conditions between 
1996 and 2001. For instance, 2 per cent felt more involved in their community 
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although the percentage claiming their area was safer than five years ago increased 
by 5 percent. The percentage on low incomes had declined by 10 percent and those 
on higher incomes had increased by 8 percent in the same period (Rhodes et al. 
2005). These statistics illustrate one of the major problems of ABIs: some of the most 
deprived neighbourhoods have high levels of population turnover so that when those 
benefitting from a new job or increased income move out, others who are less well off 
move in. 
 
The New Deal for Communities 
The NDC programme was launched in 1998 and arose out of a government 
commitment to „help turn around the poorest neighbourhoods‟ (DETR, 1998: 1). The 
same year the Social Exclusion Unit had highlighted the continuing existence of at 
least 4000 deprived neighbourhoods in England (SEU, 1998). As a result, over £2 
billion was to be spent in 39 designated areas in England‟s major cities.  
 
The approach adopted with NDC had significant differences to previous initiatives. 
This time there was no competitive bidding and particular local authorities were 
invited to identify relatively small areas with a population of about 10,000, but there 
were considerable variations. The areas selected by central government varied from 
out of town estates of mainly social housing to mixed use, inner city locations. Of the 
39 neighbourhoods selected, 28 were in the 10 percent most deprived local authority 
areas, 10 in the second, and one in the third most deprived decile. The preference 
was to choose areas located in major urban areas in all English regions. The 
boundaries were largely selected on the basis of administrative convenience; they 
did not always reflect residents‟ perceptions of „neighbourhood‟. Most could be 
defined as „inner city‟ locations with ethnically diverse populations, housing in 
different tenures and a mix of land uses, in some cases with adverse environmental 
conditions. A minority, such as in Brighton, were out of town housing estates made 
up largely of social housing. These tended to demonstrate adverse conditions across 
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Source: CLG, 2010c, p. 12. 
 
The proportion of black and minority ethnic (BME) populations in each area varied 
considerably. While 91 per cent of the population of England and Wales defined itself 
as white in the 2001 Census, in the NDC areas the average was around 77 per cent 
of residents classifying themselves as white. However, this overall figure masks a 
great deal of variation: at one extreme there were 17 NDC areas with more than 90 
per cent of white residents: at the other there were seven neighbourhoods where 
white residents make up less than half of the population. A number of NDC teams 
developed projects specifically targeting BME groups in their area, such as the 
Salaam Project in Hartlepool. This was set up to become a training centre and focal 
point for BME groups in the area (this is discussed in detail in Rausch and Gillborn, 
2003). In practice, NDC funding was applied to a variety of special needs which 
attracted particular ethnic groups, such as homework clubs and mentoring after 
school, sports and leisure for particular age groups, and meeting the health and 
dietary needs of groups with a high incidence of certain diseases.  
 
Each NDC area had approximately £5 million to spend each year and each was to be 
managed by a specially selected management board and run by a team of officers. 
Also for the first time, funding was made available for an initial start-up period in 
order to set up the board and to prepare the delivery plan. Five key policy areas were 
identified: health, education, crime, worklessness, and housing and the physical 
environment. Each board was to be constituted from the public, private and voluntary 
sectors but for the first time residents would be in the majority. Also, for the first time 
a national evaluation team was appointed to evaluate all aspects of the programme 




The national evaluation of NDC faced all the difficulties of evaluating the impact of a 
specific programme for a fixed period of time and there are significant challenges in 
capturing all the outcomes (see Lawless, 2011: 524). The team also compared 
equivalent outcomes in comparator areas not subject to regeneration programmes 
and found that the NDC areas scored highly particularly on environmental 
improvements, resident perceptions of change for the better and in the reduction in 
frequency of mental health occurrence  (op cit.: 524). 
 
As with the SRB, by 2007-08 a third of programme spending was going towards 
housing and the physical environment, often as part of plans to redevelop estates 
and include a wider mix of housing tenure. In fact, the national evaluation notes that 
overall housing tenure in the 39 NDC areas hardly changed. One explanation for this 
is that planning for the redevelopment of large housing estates often took much 
longer than anticipated and redevelopment with tenure diversification only occurred 
after project funding ceased. Health, crime and worklessness received much lower 
relative proportions of total spend. Community engagement was highlighted as a 
major objective but in practice the proportion of residents becoming actively engaged 
only reached 17 per cent in 2008 (Lawless, 2011: 528) 
 
Thus to summarise, NDC brought substantial benefits to 39 designated areas but 
these did not produce „transformational change‟ (op cit.: 527). Although local 
communities played a much bigger role than in previous initiatives, this did not result 
in „community empowerment‟ (op cit.: 528). The main benefits were recorded in 
residents‟ perceptions of the local environment and in a reduction in the incidence of 
mental health problems. The target neighbourhoods which benefitted the most were 
those in urban areas, with larger and more diverse populations and it was the 
indicators relating to changes in the local environment where improvement was most 
significant (Beatty et al., 2009). Lawless also highlights the „primacy of individual-
level factors in explaining change‟ (op cit.: 527), particularly in terms of education, 
health and employment. To conclude, Lawless suggests NDC was one more 
„pragmatic‟ interpretation and that „the NDC programme can be seen as a form of 
„locality managerialism‟ rooted in a centrally imposed framework…‟ (op cit.: 530). In 
future, the evaluation team argued, ABIs should be more focussed and aim for more 
modest but achievable outcomes for residents and their neighbourhoods: 
 
One implication of this may be the need for a more focused approach in future 
regeneration programmes: providing a range of opportunities for resident participation, 
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but perhaps thinking more strategically about the costs and benefits of the range of 
interventions associated with these broader community outcomes. The NDC 
Programme had grand, but perhaps unfocused, ambitions in relation to the community 
theme; in future a more limited, but perhaps more realistic, approach might be more 
appropriate. (CLG, 2010b: 86) 
 
Neighbourhood Management Pathfinders 
As part of a suite of initiatives, the incoming Labour Government in 1997 identified 
the importance of neighbourhood management in improving service delivery 
particularly in areas of deprivation. A series of cross-departmental Policy Action 
Teams (PATs) were set up in order to review current policy and make 
recommendations for the future. PAT 4 (SEU, 2000) was set up to consider 
neighbourhood management. This was seen as a way of formulating responsive and 
effective service delivery at the local level. Neighbourhood management‟s „…role 
should be to help deprived communities and local services improve local outcomes, 
by improving and joining up local services, and making them more responsive to 
local needs‟ (op cit.: 7).  
 
The report also recommended setting up a series of neighbourhood management 
partnerships in deprived areas in order to test these ideas and identify best practice. 
In 2001 the Government funded 35 Pathfinder partnerships in two rounds from 2001 
for seven years each at a total cost of approximately £100m. The areas selected 
were both urban and rural with populations of about 10,000 and were chosen from 
proposals submitted by local authorities. Each area was awarded £3.5m over seven 
years to cover core management, running costs and to leverage projects. Each had 
an accountable body to manage the financial arrangements and while most were 
local authorities, a few were third sector organisations or registered social landlords, 
such as housing associations. From 2007 this funding was fully integrated into 
mainstream central and local funding streams for the lifetime of the Pathfinders. 
Projects were run by small officer teams and managed by boards made up of local 
authority officers and elected members, representatives of service-providers and 
local residents. Overall, women (49%) and members of black and ethnic minorities 
(14%) were well represented on the boards. As with previous programmes, engaging 
and involving local communities was a major priority. 
 
A team was appointed in 2002 to evaluate the programme and the final report was 
published in 2008 (SQW Consulting, 2008). The findings suggest that the NMPs had 
most influence in improving policing and the environmental quality of the area. 
Schools, health services and housing agencies were also active participants. Much of 
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the work of project teams involved breaking down cultural barriers and joining up 
service providers in order to improve existing services and to experiment with new 
ones. Community engagement was an important mechanism for identifying local 
priorities and getting feedback. Regular household surveys of a sample of residents 
revealed that resident satisfaction increased by about four percentage points 
between 2003 and 2006 and more residents felt they could influence local decisions 
(SQW Consulting, 2008: 7). Similar increases in satisfaction were recorded for crime 
reduction and environmental improvements. Changes in housing, education, health 
and employment were less easy to measure. An additional significant improvement 
identified was in the working practices and cultures of the delivery teams and service 
providers. These teams often demonstrated high levels of motivation, strong links 
with key residents, board members and service providers and a willingness to 
operate beyond normal bureaucratic parameters (Pill and Bailey, 2010).   
 
The NMP programme is due to come to an end in March 2012, although some such 
as that in the City of Westminster was wound up a year earlier. Some of these 
initiatives have been absorbed into local authorities while others have developed 
modified roles or have been reconstituted as community-based, not-for-profit 
organisations. One of the main conclusions to emerge from the NMPs is that 
effective neighbourhood management can appear to be expensive in that local 
pressures can ensure that new projects are launched or existing ones are better 
resourced than might be the case in normal circumstances. Neighbourhood 
management teams and boards can be perceived as a strong lobby for additional 
expenditure when currently local budgets are heavily constrained.  
 
The ‘Big Society’ 
The coalition government was formed as a result of the general election in May 2010. 
For reasons related to the financial crisis of 2007-08, its main priority was to reduce 
the economic deficit and thereby limit the role of the state.  The „Big Society‟ agenda 
is intended to fill the gap left after substantial cuts in public expenditure have been 
implemented at central and local levels. „Localism‟ is the term being applied to a wide 
range of strategies emphasising devolving power down the hierarchy. As the coalition 
government‟s strategy document states: „It is time for a fundamental shift of power 
from Westminster to people. We will promote decentralisation and democratic 
engagement, and we will end the era of top-down government by giving new powers 





Recent research already suggests that local authorities have different 
understandings of localism and, as their central funding is cut by an average of 
7.25% per year over four years, they are not „reconfiguring their organisations for 
localism with the same energy that they are for, say, budget cuts‟ (Deloitte 2011, 
page 3). 
 
Funding for new initiatives, so far as it is available, will come from a proposed „Big 
Society bank‟ drawing on the dormant bank accounts held by the clearing banks.  
Social investment bonds are also being considered as a way of introducing private 
investment into welfare provision. Four local authority areas have been designated 
as „vanguard communities‟ to develop particular self-help initiatives, although 
Liverpool City Council has already withdrawn. Any attempt at redistribution and the 
targeting of the most deprived areas prevalent in previous government sponsored 
initiatives which gave rise to neighbourhood governance is conspicuously absent 
from this approach. 
 
The previous government had advocated „double devolution, which is the transfer of 
power „not just to the town hall, but beyond, to neighbourhoods and individual 
citizens‟ (ODPM, 2006: 8), although this commitment was conspicuously absent from 
a subsequent policy document on empowerment (CLG, 2008; Bailey, 2010).  More 
recently the Conservative party has argued for varying degrees of localism with a 
greater emphasis on community self-help (The Conservative Party, 2009).  
 
The coalition government‟s commitment to the Big Society has been criticised on 
philosophical, political and practical grounds but it is not possible to examine all these 
arguments here in any detail.  Kisby (2010), for example, refers to the „vacuity‟ of the 
concept in that it attempts to revive ideas around „small state‟, „active citizenship‟ and 
volunteering promoted by previous Conservative governments. It tends to favour 
community organisations in more affluent areas (with high levels of social capital) 
and does nothing to challenge the growing levels of economic inequality or reduce 
social exclusion. Powers are included in the Localism Bill (2010) to enable 
communities to prepare land use-orientated neighbourhood plans but only where 
these set out new opportunities for development. The Act of Parliament will come into 




Thus May 2010 marks a dramatic shift for deprived neighbourhoods away from the 
relatively well resourced, big state model of targeting the most deprived communities 
to a low cost model emphasising self-help, volunteerism, and with no positive 
discrimination towards those in greatest need.  In addition, as local government 
reduces its expenditure local communities are being persuaded to take over local 
services such as libraries and community centres. All public bodies are being 
encouraged to dispose of any unwanted land and buildings to community-based 
organisations, such development trusts. These operate on a similar non-profit basis 
to community development corporations in the USA (Salamon, 2011). And like the 
USA, it will be those areas which have a more skilled and affluent population which 
will benefit most from this policy shift. 
 
Conclusions 
This chapter began by asking whether taking a neighbourhood approach to issues of 
deprivation was likely to be effective, how far deprived areas changed for the better 
and whether or not the strategy was over-ambitious. From the evidence presented 
from the three sets of programme case studies it certainly represented a major 
commitment of economic and political capital. Large amounts of public money were 
channelled into the most deprived areas and heroic efforts were made at the local 
level in order to ensure they were used effectively. Yet all the evaluations discussed 
here tend to suggest the outcomes and impact were modest and that in reality the 
relative differentials between areas and populations in terms of income, employment, 
health and education did not change a great deal. However, the programmes were 
not without positive outcomes. Communities were engaged and services undoubtedly 
improved for those living in the defined areas but when the money ran out those 
service levels were often hard to sustain in the longer term. For a variety of 
organisational, cultural and financial reasons there was only a limited transfer of „best 
practice‟ from these programmes to those engaged in regeneration and service 
delivery elsewhere. More to the point, it is almost impossible to establish the 
counterfactual; how much more deprived might these areas have become without 
programme interventions? 
 
ABIs have advantages in targeting resources on those in greatest need and relatively 
low cost improvements, such as increased policing, improved youth and community 
facilities and housing renovations can have a big impact on residents‟ perceptions of 
where they live. But reversing growing inequalities in income, health and life 
chances, as the original political rhetoric suggested, requires a long-term 
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commitment at both national and local levels. „Big Society‟ models may also bring 
benefits of increased social capital, increased volunteering and even greater 
engagement in „civil society‟ but they will tend to benefit the relatively affluent and 
well organised neighbourhoods over and above those with real social problems. 
Meanwhile, income differentials have widened, unemployment is increasing and 
social mobility has declined (Wilkinson and Pickett, 2009). A series of urban riots 
taking place in August 2011 in the more deprived parts of London, Manchester and 
Birmingham has reopened the debate about growing inequalities and opportunities in 
British society. Clearly, turning round the poorest neighbourhoods has proved to be a 
much bigger challenge than originally envisaged in 1997. Perhaps the most important 
conclusion to draw is that targeting deprivation in narrowly defined neighbourhoods 
will only have a limited impact without also addressing broader social and economic 
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